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What makes people spontaneously adopt the perspective of others? Previous work
suggested that perspective taking can serve understanding the actions of others.
Two studies corroborate and extend that interpretation. The first study varied cues to
intentionality of eye gaze and action, and found that the more the actor was perceived as
potentially interacting with the objects, the stronger the tendency to take his perspective.
The second study investigated how manipulations of gaze affect the tendency to adopt
the perspective of another reaching for an object. Eliminating gaze cues by blurring the
actor’s face did not reduce perspective-taking, suggesting that in the absence of gaze
information, observers rely entirely on the action. Intriguingly, perspective-taking was
higher when gaze and action did not signal the same intention, suggesting that in presence
of ambiguous behavioral intention, people are more likely take the other’s perspective to
try to understand the action.
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INTRODUCTION
Near/far, above/below, right/left presuppose a referential center of
orientation. Because we cannot separate ourselves from our bod-
ies, it is natural to think that this center of orientation is the body.
As Husserl put it, “the ‘far’ is far from me, from my Body; the
‘to the right’ refers to the right side of my Body” (1952/1989).
But what happens in presence of others? Are there circumstances
where “to the left” with respect to another’s body is preferred to
“to the right” with respect to my own?
Evidence that the presence of others may change our own cod-
ing of spatial locations of objects is provided by recent studies
investigating spatial judgment (Tversky and Hard, 2009; Zwickel,
2009; Zwickel and Müller, 2010). In a typical experiment, par-
ticipants viewed a photograph of two objects on a table. When
participants were asked to describe the location of one object
relative to another, the dominant response was to adopt their
own spatial perspective. If, however, the scene included a person
looking or reaching for one of the objects, almost one third of par-
ticipants spontaneously adopted the other person’s perspective,
describing the locations from the other’s right or left (Tversky
and Hard, 2009). These findings indicate that the presence of
another personmay encourage participants to spontaneously take
that person spatial perspective, and describe the locations of
the objects from her right or left. Similarly, studies investigat-
ing spontaneous visual perspective taking found that observers
were slower to make self-perspective judgments when the scene
includes a person looking at the scene from a different visual per-
spective, suggesting that even when the other person’s perspective
is irrelevant to the task, observers cannot prevent computing the
other’s perspective (Samson et al., 2010).
What makes people spontaneously take others’ perspectives
despite the very real presence of their own? The “mere presence”
of a human body does not seem sufficient to elicit spontaneous
perspective taking (Mazzarella et al., 2012). People adopt the
perspective of another person who acts (Frischen et al., 2009;
Thirioux et al., 2010) or is positioned to act on objects and even
more so when attention is drawn to the person’s potential for
action, for instance, by phrasing the query about spatial relations
in terms of action (e.g., “In relation to the bottle, where does he
place the book?” Tversky and Hard, 2009). What is more, people
even adopt the perspective of simple geometric shapes when the
actions of the shapes appear intentional (Zwickel, 2009).
Together, the research suggests that spontaneous perspective
takingmay be related to understanding and anticipating another’s
action rather than to the mere presence of a human body. If
so, perspective taking should increase when the perceived inten-
tion to act increases. This prediction was tested in the first of
two experiments. Participants were presented with brief videos
(rather than still photographs) depicting two objects, a milk car-
toon and a glass full of milk, on a table, with or without a person
behind (see Figure 1). Because looking at an object often signals
intention to act on the object (Allison et al., 2000; Mennie et al.,
2007; Becchio et al., 2008; Pierno et al., 2008; Sartori et al., 2009;
Innocenti et al., 2012), the tendency to take the actor’s perspective
should be stronger when the actor looks at one of the objects and
even stronger when the actor reaches toward the object.
Findings concerning the contribution of gaze cues to sponta-
neous perspective taking have not been consistent. Using static
photographs, Tversky and Hard (2009) found no significant dif-
ference in the proportion of description from the other’s point
of view for looking and looking-and-reaching scenes, suggesting
that gaze shifts and overt hand actions have similar effects on
perspective taking. In contrast, however, Mazzarella et al. (2012)
found that the actor’s hand action, but not the actor’s gaze,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 455 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Furlanetto et al. Through your eyes
FIGURE 1 | Final frames for the four videos used in Experiment 1. In the
No Actor video (A) no actor model was present. In the Actor video (B) the
actor was stationary and looked down, seemingly unaware of the objects
on the table. In the Gaze video (C) the actor turned his head to look toward,
but did not reach for the glass. In the Gaze Action video (D) the actor turned
the head to look toward and reached for the glass.
modulated the tendency to adopt his perspective. The question
remains therefore open as to whether gaze contributes to per-
spective taking. To address this issue, in a second experiment we
manipulated the congruency of gaze and action cues. Gaze cues
can be informative but also produce ambiguity with respect to
others’ actions and behavioral intentions. For instance, football
and basketball players often “fake” to fool their opponents, by
looking in one direction and acting in another. We predicted that
if perspective taking is related to understanding another’s action,
then, by making the agent’s intention ambiguous, incongruous
gaze would increase perspective taking.
STUDY 1: SPONTANEOUS PERSPECTIVE TAKING INCREASES
AS PERCEIVED INTENTIONALITY INCREASES
Study 1 was designed to test whether the perceived potential for
interaction with objects increases spontaneous perspective taking.
We predicted that the more a person is perceived as potentially
acting on an object, the greater the need to understand the action,
hence in the scene, the stronger the tendency to spatially represent
the locations of the objects from the actor’s perspective.
METHODS
Participants
One hundred and twenty undergraduate students (53 male and
67 female; mean age: 23.5 ± 3.3, range 18–37 years) from the
University of Turin volunteered to take part in the experiment.
All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right handed,
and were naïve with respect to the purpose of the study.
Materials and procedures
Participants were presented with one of four videos depicting two
objects, a milk cartoon and a glass full of milk, on a table. Scene
information was manipulated by introducing an actor model and
by varying the actor’s gaze and action (see Figure 1). In the No
Actor video (n = 30) no actor model was present. The other three
videos included an actor. The Actor video (n = 30) showed the
actor stationary, looking down, seemingly unaware of the objects
on the table. In the Gaze video (n = 30) the actor turned his
head to look toward the glass, but did not reach it. In the Gaze
Action video (n = 30) the actor turned the head to look toward
and reached for the glass. Videos including the actor started with
the actor looking down for 2 s. The actor then turned his head to
look at the object (in the Gaze and the Gaze Action video) and,
after 1 s, reached for the object (in the Gaze Action video). Each
video lasted 4.15 s. The question “In relation to the glass, where
FIGURE 2 | Percentages of 1PP, 3PP, and neutral responses in
Experiment 1.
is the milk cartoon?” was displayed below the last frame of each
video and remained visible until response or until 9 s elapsed.
Participants’ verbal responses were recorded by the experimenter
who was sitting behind the participant.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The responses were scored as 1PP (first person perspective) if the
answer was from the participant’s point of view, 3PP (third per-
son perspective) if the answer was from the actor’s viewpoint, and
neutral if the answer gave spatial information from neither per-
spective (e.g., “next to,” “to the side,” “on the table”). Examples
of responses scored as 1PP include: “right,” “on the right,” “to
the right from my perspective.” Examples of responses scored as
3PP include: “left,” “to his left,” “to the left from his perspective.”
Scored responses were converted into three binary variables for
analysis: one variable was coded 1 if the response was 3PP and
0 if it was not; the second variable was coded 1 if the response
was 1PP and 0 if it was not; the third variable was coded 1 if
the response was neutral and 0 if it was not. To assess the influ-
ence of agency cues on spontaneous perspective taking, separate
binary logistic regression analyses were conducted on 3PP, 1PP,
and neutral responses. The type of video (No Actor, Actor, Gaze,
Gaze Action) was entered as independent variable of interest.
In line with predictions, binary logistic regression analysis on
3PP responses yielded a significant linear effect of agency (Wald
χ2 = 10.903, df = 1, odd ratio = 1.968, CI = 1.317–2.941, p =
0.001). The percentage of 3PP responses was highest for Gaze
Action video (43.3%), lower for the Gaze video (36.7%), and
even lower for the Actor video (30%, see Figure 2). For the No
actor video, only one participant adopted the 3PP perspective.
Similarly, the percentage of 1PP responses was affected by agency
cues (Wald χ2 = 7.872, df = 1, odd ratio = 0.591, CI = 0.409–
0.853, p = 0.005). The percentage of 1PP responses was highest
for the No Actor video (90%), lower for the Actor video (63.3%)
and the Gaze (63.3%) video, and lowest for the Gaze Action video
(53.3%, see Figure 2). The percentage of neutral responses was
not affected by agency cues (Waldχ2 = 0.993, odd ratio= 0.645,
CI = 0.272–1.528, p = 0.319).
Together, these findings corroborate and extend the idea
that increased potential for interaction enhances spontaneous
perspective taking.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 455 | 2
Furlanetto et al. Through your eyes
STUDY 2: SPONTANEOUS PERSPECTIVE TAKING INCREASES
AS INCONGRUITY OF INTENTION INCREASES
Gaze is an important source of information about others’ inten-
tions and actions (Allison et al., 2000; Mennie et al., 2007; Becchio
et al., 2008; Pierno et al., 2008; Sartori et al., 2009; Innocenti
et al., 2012). From the gaze of another person, we can infer what
the person is interested in, what she might desire, and, conse-
quently, what she will do next (Pierno et al., 2006). Gaze direction,
however, can also produce ambiguity with respect to the other’s
intention. This can occur, when gaze conveys conflicting informa-
tion with respect to the behavioral intention of the agent (Hudson
and Jellema, 2011). In this situation, the agent’s action can be per-
ceived as ambiguous and observers might be encouraged to adopt
the perspective of the other person to understand her intention.
Spontaneous perspective takingmight thus be expected to be even
stronger when gaze is incongruous than when gaze and action
signal the same, and therefore unambiguous, intention.
To test this prediction, in Study 2, we presented participants
with videos of an actor reaching for a glass in presence of a milk
cartoon. The actor either looked toward the glass before reach-
ing (Gaze Action) or reached without looking (Ambiguous Gaze
Action). We predicted that the absence of a shift of gaze in the
direction of action would make the action harder to understand
and therefore increase the likelihood of adopting the actor per-
spective. In contrast, no increase in perspective taking should be
expected when access to the actor’s gaze during reaching is pre-
vented by blurring the actor’s face (Blurred Gaze Action). This is
because, in this situation, the absence of gaze cues does not render
the agent’s behavioral intention ambiguous.
METHODS
Participants
Based on the prevalence of 3PP/1PP responses for the Gaze
Action scene compared to the Actor scene and the Gaze scene
in Experiment 1 (9.7%), we estimated that we would need 135
participants in each condition to evaluate the effect of gaze
manipulations on 3PP and 1PP responses (see Supplementary
Material). Four hundred and five undergraduate students (191
male and 214 female; mean age: 23.3 ± 3.3; range 18–48 years)
from the University of Turin were thus recruited to take part
in Experiment 2. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
were right handed, and were naïve with respect to the purpose of
the study.
Materials and procedures
Procedures were the same as those in Study 1, except that
participants were presented with one of three videos depict-
ing an actor reaching for one of two objects—a milk car-
toon and a glass full of milk—on a table (see Figure 3). In
the Gaze Action video (n = 135) the actor turned his head,
looked toward and reached for the glass (see Study 1). In the
Blurred Gaze Action video (n = 135) the actor turned his head,
looked toward and reached for the glass as in the Gaze Action
video. Access to the actor’s gaze direction was, however, pre-
vented by blurring the actor’s face. In the Ambiguous Gaze
Action video (n = 135) the actor reached for the glass without
looking at it.
FIGURE 3 | Final frames for videos in Experiment 2. In the Gaze Action
video (A) the actor turned the head to look toward and reached for the glass.
In the Blurred Gaze Action video (B) the actor turned his head, looked
toward and reached for the glass but participant’s access to the actor’s gaze
direction was prevented by blurring the actor’s face. In the Ambiguous Gaze
Action video (C), the actor reached the glass without looking toward it.
FIGURE 4 | Percentages of 1PP, 3PP and neutral responses in
Experiment 2.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
As in Study 1, the responses were scored as 1PP if the answer was
from the participant’s point of view, 3PP if the answer was from
the actor’s viewpoint, and neutral if the answer gave spatial infor-
mation from neither perspective. Separate chi square analyses
were conducted to compare observed frequencies of 3PP (vs. 1PP
and neutral responses), 1PP (vs. 3PP and neutral responses), and
neutral responses (vs. 1PP and 3PP responses) for the Ambiguous
Gaze Action and for the Blurred Gaze Action scenes with expected
frequencies for the Gaze Action scene.
Strikingly, when the actor reached without looking, 51.1%
of the participants adopted his perspective (see Figure 4). Chi-
square analysis revealed a marginally significant increase in 3PP
responses for the Ambiguous Gaze Action scene compared to
the Gaze Action scene (51.1% vs. 40.7%; χ2 = 3.713, df = 1,
p = 0.054, r = 0.166). Conversely, 1PP responses were signif-
icantly lower for videos in which the actor reached without
looking than for videos in which reaching was preceded by look-
ing (40% vs. 52,6%; χ2 = 8.586, df = 1, p = 0.003, r = 0.252).
Taken together, these findings suggest that perspective taking
was increased for the Ambiguous Gaze Action scene compared
to the Gaze Action scene. As predicted, Blurred Gaze Action and
Gaze Action videos yielded equivalent percentages of 3PP (42.2%
vs. 40.7%; χ2 = 0.112, df = 1, p = 0.738, r = 0.029) and 1PP
responses (52.5% vs. 49.6%; χ2 = 2.478, df = 1, p = 0.115, r =
0.029). Neutral responses were neither affected by the ambi-
guity of actor’s intentions (6.6% vs. 8.8%; χ2 = 1.071, df = 1,
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p = 0.301, r = 0.089) nor by the gaze blurring (6.6% vs. 8.1%;
χ2 = 0.476, df = 1, p = 0.490, r = 0.059).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Converging evidence from social neuroscience suggests that peo-
ple use knowledge of their own bodies to understand other
people’s behavior (Grafton, 2009). Accordingly, understanding of
others’ actions, intentions, and emotions has been proposed to
rely on mechanism of embodied simulation (e.g., Becchio et al.,
2012). Together with previous research (e.g., Tversky and Hard,
2009), the present results suggest that, in the service of action
understanding, people may also embody others’ location, spa-
tially representing the world from others’ point of view rather
than from their own.
AGENCY CUES IN VIDEO DISPLAYS
The mere presence of another person in a position to act on
objects encouraged about 30% of respondents to take the other
person’s perspective. Critically, as demonstrated in Study 1, the
tendency to take the actor’s perspective increased when the actor
looked at one of the objects (36.7%) and became even stronger
when the actor reached for one object (43.3%). This corroborates
the interpretation that perspective taking increases to the extent
that the person is perceived to be potentially interacting with the
objects.
Previous studies investigating spontaneous perspective tak-
ing have reported considerably lower percentages of third-person
responses for looking and reaching scenes then those reported
here (e.g., 22 and 29%, respectively; Tversky and Hard, 2009).
One aspect of the present study that is likely to have con-
tributed to increase perspective taking is the use of videos instead
of photographs. Videos provide dynamic cues to action not
available in static displays. As human observers are particularly
sensitive to human body movements (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007),
it is plausible that the gradual unfolding of action emphasizes
and draws attention to action, thereby increasing perspective
taking.
A question for future research is whether perspective taking
is further encouraged by the observation of actions potentially
directed at the observer. Social cognition has been proposed to
be substantially different when we are in interaction with others
(second-person interaction) rather than merely observing them
(third-person interaction; Schilbach et al., 2013). Second-person
interaction modulates emphatic brain responses (Singer et al.,
2006) and there is evidence that simulation of another person’s
action, as reflected in the activation of the observer motor system,
gets stronger the more the other is perceived as an interaction
partner (Kourtis et al., 2010). In terms of perspective taking,
observation of the actions of a potentially interacting partner
might thus be expected to elicit stronger perspective compared
to observation of the actions of a third party we do not interact
with.
WHEN LOOKING IS AMBIGUOUS
Mazzarella et al. (2012) reported that action triggered
perspective-taking, but gaze cues did not. They suggests that this
may be because eye gaze is not critically relevant, as grasping
is, to understanding what an actor is currently doing. However,
other research has shown that other gaze direction is informative
not only about future intentions but also about present intentions
and motor intentions and can change the way current actions are
perceived (Pierno et al., 2008). Reaching is typically guided by
the eyes. Gaze leads the hand to the object to be grasped and
supports predictive motor control in manipulation (Johansson
et al., 2001). Observing a person grasping without looking may
thus be perceived as ambiguous. What is he planning to do? Why
is he not looking at the object he is reaching for? In Experiment 2
we found that compared to a situation in which gaze and action
signaled the same intention, perspective taking increased for
reaching without looking, apparently in an effort to understand
the intended action in the face of conflicting cues. In contrast,
we observed no increase in perspective taking when looking cues
were eliminated by blurring the eyes, suggesting that when there
was no conflict, observers used the direction of reaching as a cue
to understand the intention.
Allocation of attention to gaze cues is a flexible process that
depends in part on the perceived ambiguity of an agent’s inten-
tions. Observers do not attend to an agent’s gaze direction auto-
matically, but rather do so when other social cues are insufficient
to determine the immediate course or goal of the action (Hudson
and Jellema, 2011). The present findings suggest that similarly
to attention, perspective taking may not be triggered directly by
the perceptual properties of gaze stimuli, but may depend on
gaze intentional significance in the overall context. When gaze
and action cues convey the same information, gaze processing
adds little to action in terms of intention attribution. Eliminating
gaze cues has thus no influence on perspective taking. However,
when gaze and action convey incongruous information making
the agent’s intention ambiguous, gaze direction becomes relevant
and may increase spontaneous perspective taking. These findings
may help to reconcile inconsistent findings concerning the relative
contributions of gaze and action cues to perspective taking (e.g.,
Tversky and Hard, 2009; Mazzarella et al., 2012) by showing that,
rather than depending on specific bodily cues (and not others),
perspective taking is influenced by the attribution of intentions to
others.
CONCLUSIONS
Here, participants watched videos of two objects on a table under
varying conditions. They were asked to report the spatial rela-
tions between the two objects. When only the objects were in
the scene, participants responded from their own viewpoint.
However, when the scene included an actor in the position to
act on the objects, participants frequently took the actor’s per-
spective. The first study showed that the more the actor was
perceived as potentially interacting with the objects, the stronger
the tendency to take his perspective. The second study investi-
gated how manipulations of gaze affect the tendency to adopt
the perspective of another reaching for an object and found
that perspective-taking increased when gaze and reaching infor-
mation was incongruous making the agent’s behavioral inten-
tion ambiguous. These findings add further support to the idea
that spontaneous perspective taking is in the service of action
understanding. When the action is more difficult to understand,
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there is more perspective taking. It is as if observers are putting
themselves in the place of the actor to understand what he is
intending to do.
But why would someone spontaneously take the spatial per-
spective of another when the other appears to be engaged in
action? Interacting with others, understanding what they are
doing and what they are likely to do next all require some com-
prehension of what the world looks like to them. As suggested
previously (Tversky andHard, 2009), taking the perspective of the
other may be effective for planning a response to others’ actions,
but also for learning by observation. What makes the current
results surprising is that the action was mundane—so no need
to learn by observation—and required no complementary action
in response. Even more surprising is that the perspective was
expressed in language, in the especially confusable terms, “left”
and “right,” which are well-known to take more time to pro-
duce and to producemore errors than other directional terms like
“front” and “back.” Despite this, when the agent’s intention was
ambiguous, the majority of participants spontaneously adopted
the agent’s perspective rather than their own.
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